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NSC review(s) completed.

State Department review completed

JUN 3 - 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. FRANK G. WISNER
Central Intelligence Agency
Room 224, Administration Building

SUBJECT: Project for the 8th U.N. General Assembly

This is to inform you of the origin and development of the project which this staff has taken on, at the direction of Mr. C. D. Jackson, on behalf of Ambassador Lodge. I understand that Ambassador Lodge has discussed the matter with you. The following is intended to supplement that discussion:

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1. At the April 9 meeting of the Psychological Strategy Board, the Chairman explained, and the Board discussed briefly, the desire of Ambassador Lodge for more abundant psychological support at the next UN General Assembly. Following this meeting Mr. Jackson informed the PSB staff of Ambassador Lodge's desires, and requested PSB staff to provide the central staff service for this project. At his request we obtained for Ambassador Lodge certain materials on Soviet violations of human rights, including certain extracts from the [] reports. A broad list of 20 general topics (see attachment 1), covering aspects of Soviet bloc behavior which constitute exploitable vulnerabilities, was prepared for Ambassador Lodge.

2. On May 1, at a meeting between Ambassador Lodge, C. D. Jackson, Abbott Washburn, and Horace Craig and myself representing PSB staff, further aspects of this project were discussed. (See Attachment 2, last paragraph.) Ambassador Lodge agreed that Assistant Secretary of State Hickerson, UNA, be informed of PSB staff's assignment on this project, and of the need for UNA's cooperation. On behalf of PSB staff Dr. Craig has been designated to supervise the project, and Wallace Irwin, Jr. of his office has been named the principal action officer under him.

3. On May 11 Dr. Craig and Mr. Irwin met with Assistant Secretary Hickerson to provide for liaison. Mr. Hickerson agreed on the importance of liaison with PSB on this project and designated his Special Assistant, Herbert A. Fierst, as the main contact in UNA. Mr. Irwin has been in direct liaison with Mr. Fierst, and through him with other members of UNA, since that time. (See Attachment 6.)

4. Meanwhile, in order to initiate the necessary intelligence support for this project, PSB staff made arrangements with []
[] Acting Chief, OIR/PIRS (who is the regular PSB contact

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with OIR), to have members of his staff assigned to the necessary work. [] designated [] to supervise the intelligence project. As guidance for development of bibliographies, etc., OIR was given the original 20-item list and a further list of 10 selected topics (see attachment 3, dated May 19) developed informally in PSB staff.

5. Dr. Craig and Mr. Irwin met with Ambassador Lodge on May 18 (see attachment 4) and obtained valuable clarification from him of the nature of the project as he conceives it. Further clarification was obtained through Mr. Irwin's trip to USUN in New York on May 21 (see attachment 5). The chief action officer for Ambassador Lodge at USUN is John G. Ross.

6. On May 19 Mr. Jackson, as Chairman of PSB, sent to the members of the Board (including Mr. Dulles) a memorandum suggesting a "Free World Congress" to obtain non-attributable support for U.S. world policies as outlined in the President's April 16 speech. This memorandum ended with the observation that "the whole operation would, of course, be geared in with Cabot Lodge's plans for the . . . UN session". PSB staff is, therefore, keeping in mind the relation between this proposal and the UN project.

The above summary, with attachments, should give you the essentials of this project as developed to date. As noted in attachment 5, the project involves three basic aspects: (1) intelligence as "ammunition"; (2) a framework of policies and principles to serve as guidance; and (3) development and proper "orchestration" of implementing operations.

Intelligence

PSB staff has already initiated intelligence support through OIR, as indicated above. This support function will doubtless continue through the summer, with revision of requirements from time to time. It would seem desirable to bring OIR together with the other intelligence agencies, including CIA, to arrange for the best handling of available materials. It will probably be necessary to service this project not only with intelligence in the shape of "ammunition" (Soviet bloc vulnerabilities), but also with estimates of the probable world situation (including Soviet moves) in which the project will be launched.

Policy framework

This project is a major one, which must be properly related to Government policies, strategic plans, and other programs. At the request of Mr. Ross, USUN, the PSB staff has therefore begun the drafting of a paper based upon NSC and other appropriate Government sources which will attempt to provide a broad but meaningful framework and orientation for the project. This paper

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should be ready for consideration within a week in order to facilitate the shaping of the program as soon as possible.

operational planning and execution

The planning and carrying out of specific actions must wait until the intelligence and policy-framework stages mentioned above are at least partially completed. These actions are expected to involve the PSB member agencies to a considerable extent, as well as USUN. They will probably include psychological activities at home and abroad which will not always be directly keyed to the General Assembly opening on September 15. They must be realistically adjusted to the current world psychological climate as well as to the policy framework mentioned above, and they may include efforts to improve that climate before and during the operation of the project.

As soon as enough progress is evident in the intelligence and policy-statement activities now underway, the agencies will be asked to begin the development of coordinated action projects. In the meantime, it is hoped that this memorandum will provide some advance notice to the action officers who will be called upon soon.

George A. Morgan
Acting Director

cc: Mr. C. Tracy Barnes

Mr. Robert Amory, Jr. ✓

Attachments: 6

1. List of Soviet Vulnerabilities for Possible Exploitation at the UN, April 30, 1953
2. Conversation with Ambassador Lodge (Memorandum for the Record, May 4, 1953)
3. "Human Rights" Project - Suggested Topics for Intelligence Development, May 19, 1953
4. Valley Forge Problem; "Human Rights" Project (Memorandum of Conversation - Ambassador Lodge, Dr. Craig, Mr. Irwin, May 18)
5. "Human Rights" -- Consultation with Ambassador Lodge and USUN Staff (Memorandum for the Record, May 22, 1953)
6. Coordination of Ambassador Lodge's Requests (Memorandum of Conversation - Mr. Hickerson, Dr. Craig, Mr. Irwin, May 12)

LIST OF SOVIET VULNERABILITIES
FOR POSSIBLE EXPLOITATION AT THE UN

The following topics--each representing an action or failure to act by the Soviet Bloc--represent vulnerabilities which can be exploited by the USUN delegation or through other channels. Exploitation of each topic would have the dual purpose of putting pressure on the Soviets to alter their conduct, and calling attention of the free world to the injustices of Soviet actions and the obstacles they place in the path of world peace.

Some of these topics have already been exploited in some degree. Background information on all of them is available in the Government. Priorities for further exploitation should depend on policy coordination, on the results of research, and on the relevance of each topic to a broad strategic concept.

I. USSR and its Empire -- violation of Rights

1. Destruction of religion
2. Perversion of science, art, history, and literature.
3. Police terror, purges, political murders.
4. Mass deportations.
5. Cultural genocide of national minorities.
6. Coercion of children and destruction of the family.
7. Slave labor economy and war preparations at expense of living standards.
8. Class distinctions (work, income, education, travel, vacations, etc.)

II. Soviet Aggression

9. Direct aggression against Poland and Finland.
10. Absorption of Baltic States and other territorial accessions in Europe.
11. Domination of European satellites.
12. "Sponsored" aggression in Korea, Indochina, Malaya, Laos.

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III. Relations with the Free World

13. Soviet violation of international agreements.
14. Hate campaigns and "peace aggression" (including BW charges).
15. "Banditry" -- crimes on and over the high seas; kidnappings; brainwashing and forced confessions of free world citizens.
16. Captives -- World War II (German and Japanese prisoners, Greek children).
17. Subversion by world communism; cooperation with fascists and other extremists.
18. Drug traffic, black marketeering, illegal trade.

IV. The Iron Curtain

19. Bars to travel and free communication -- the "Iron Prison", hindering free exit -- the attempt to keep the Soviet and free worlds in mutual ignorance of each other.
20. Non-participation of Soviet bloc in specialized UN organs and other international bodies (scientific, cultural, etc.), both governmental and private.

April 30, 1953

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May 4, 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Ambassador Lodge

Those present: Ambassador Lodge, C. D. Jackson, George Morgan,
Abbott Washburn, Horace S. Craig

Ambassador Lodge expressed considerable interest in the prisoner of war returnee program. He was surprised, upon looking at the map which indicates the geographic distribution of the returned prisoners of war, to learn that the enemy has such detailed knowledge of industrial and other key centers in the United States. He thought that it would be desirable for Craig to go to Valley Forge General Hospital to determine whether a well-spoken and personable POW might be available for a reception in New York to be given by Ambassador Lodge, at which time the selected soldier would be given an opportunity to describe indoctrination procedures in the enemy camp to a diversified group of United Nations officials.

Ambassador Lodge was very interested in and pleased with the list of some twenty subjects drawn up for him by the PSB staff for psychological exploitation in the General Assembly. He said that he would like to have, as resolutions come up daily, a series of five-minute punch speeches to give each time in order to make headlines. He went on to say that a two-hour speech can be very effective, but results in only one headline in a given week. He liked also the idea of developing the theme of the Communist regime's perversion of Marxism. He referred to the individuals who accepted such rearrangement of thought and dogma as being intellectual eunuchs.

Mr. Jackson emphasized the importance of the electromagnetic warfare problem which Ambassador Lodge accepted as one of the most difficult crises that we are faced with today and asked for more details on the subject at a later date. He concurred readily in Craig's suggestion that Craig follow up in G-2 in order to obtain further "horror stories" from the Eurasian Branch.

Mr. Jackson said that we would all be happier if the Department of State were informed officially that Ambassador Lodge is putting certain requests to the PSB staff for development at the UN. Ambassador Lodge said that he would inform Mr. Hickerson that PSB is responsible to Ambassador Lodge for such activities, with the help of UNA,

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Department of State. Mr. Lodge was assured that on all such requests to date, the Department of State has been extremely cooperative and helpful.

H. S. Craig

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May 19, 1953

"HUMAN RIGHTS" PROJECT**Suggested Topics for Intelligence Development**

1. Soviet bloc versus international economic and social programs (FAO, WHO, technical assistance, UNICEF, emergency food aid program to India, food to Italy, etc.); show Soviet non-participation in these activities, false condemnation of them, and failure to develop bona fide activities of its own in the same field. Show also poor progress in USSR, especially in non-Russian "underdeveloped" areas.
2. Soviet treatment of religious and ethnic minorities (especially those with counterparts in the free world): Jews, Moslems, Greek Catholics, Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Volga Germans, etc.
3. Women and children: Soviet "concern" over them, as shown in WFDW and other front groups, which roundly condemn the capitalist world for treatment of women and children. Contrast this with Soviet bloc practices as to the status of women, children, and the family; also contrast (if appropriate) with Soviet bloc attitudes during UN consideration of questions in this field.
4. Violation of international agreements: skeleton on this is already done. Can we select particular items from the list of violations, and develop further the facts of the violations up to date? (Especially on Eastern Europe -- violation of Atlantic Charter pledge and basic liberties.)
5. Forced confessions -- an exploded technique of Soviet psychological terror (the Moscow Doctors case).
6. Economic statistics published by USSR and Bloc: especially wages, prices, real wages, including social and medical services, etc., hours of work, productivity, national income, proportion of national product devoted to civilian vs. military purposes:
 - (a) How much do they publish, and specifically how much do they submit to UN bodies, as compared with other countries?
 - (b) What reasons do they offer (official secrets, etc.) for not publishing more?
 - (c) Where these statistics are deficient, what is the best picture we have of the reality -- present situation and degree of progress?

7. Hate campaigns: Contrast between the conspicuous softening of Soviet bloc international propaganda, gradually built up again, and the internal anti-West propaganda (especially anti-US but not exclusively) which has continued in its virulence almost without interruption. Show direct official sponsorship, coordination among Bloc countries, and dates (demonstrating continuity -- stress early postwar and after Stalin's death).
8. "Peace aggression" -- contrast Soviet use of World Peace Council and affiliates for psychological aggression with Soviet failure in the UN to work for peace or for the advancement of any of the groups which WPC affiliates seek to lure -- doctors, lawyers, scientists, women, etc.
9. Bars to travel and free communication across the Iron Curtain (in both directions).
10. Return of World War II prisoners.

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as only suggested approaches, and emphasized that there are no limitations on subject matter at this point other than the main idea of anti-Communist materials. Although he appeared to have the free world (including neutral) audience mainly in mind, he said nothing to exclude the idea of appealing to dissidence within the Soviet bloc. He emphasized that he wanted items which would make headlines, and that the material must be strictly documentary and "bullet proof" as to its authenticity. He also made clear that he had in mind a strong initiative in the UN; the problem of refuting Soviet bloc accusations, although obviously important, is separate from this project.

(b) Manner of exploitation: In response to questions, Ambassador Lodge said he anticipates exploitation of the materials developed through all means available to the Government: IIA, CIA, U.S. representatives abroad, etc., in addition to the UN. He considered the UN forum as a very important segment, but only one segment, of the total propaganda apparatus at the disposal of the U.S. In addition, he agreed emphatically that friendly delegations should be encouraged wherever possible to carry the ball, and that the U.S. delegation should stay in the background as much as possible.

(c) Selection of topics: In order to make a preliminary selection of topics and approaches, Ambassador Lodge suggested a conference in New York during the week of May 25 with himself, Jack Ross and Charles Allen of the USUN staff, and Mr. Irwin. He did not feel that it was early enough to be definite about topics but it may be possible through this conference to get an early selection of subjects for development by the intelligence community in Washington.

(d) Form of material: Again Ambassador Lodge stressed his desire for "bullet-proof documentation". The problem of developing speeches, releases, etc. is a separate matter to be worked out later.

(e) Deadlines: Ambassador Lodge said that his major planning effort with the USUN staff will begin in August, at which time the particular items to be used can be chosen on a fairly firm basis. (Presumably, therefore, August 1 should be our deadline for completion of intelligence projects in Washington, from which the final selection can be made.)

(f) Staff contacts: We informed Ambassador Lodge of our contacts with Assistant Secretary Hickerson and Herbert Fierst, and of Mr. Fierst's suggestion that Irwin should confer with Charles Allen in New York on this project. He welcomed this information and suggested in addition that we confer with Jack Ross of USUN. He said he would inform Mr. Ross of our conversation.

Ambassador Lodge seemed much pleased with the cooperation he had received thus far and optimistic over the prospects for a successful project. From our standpoint the conversation was very helpful in providing orientation. The next practical question to be attacked is the selection of topics for intelligence development: inevitably this will be a considerably broader list than the final selection to be made in August or later, but the lead-time for intelligence work will require that the preliminary selection be made as soon as possible. We hope that this preliminary selection will emerge from the New York meeting in the week of May 25.

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May 22, 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: "Human Rights" -- Consultation with Ambassador Lodge
and USUN Staff

Following are notes on all-day consultation with members of the USUN staff in New York as well as with Ambassador Lodge. I talked with the following individuals on the staff: John C. Ross, Ambassador Wadsworth, Charles Allen (Chief of the Public Information Division), Tom Corey, and Jim Barco.

As a result of these talks it became clear that the "human rights" project involves three essential aspects:

- (1) the development of "ammunition" in the form of finished intelligence;
- (2) the development of a broad framework of principles to serve as guidance for the entire project; and,
- (3) the "orchestration" phase, which may involve one or more operational plans for implementation both through the UN and through other available media.

A further meeting in New York with the Ambassador and his staff has been set up for Tuesday, May 26 at 10:30 in the Ambassador's office. I will attend this meeting in the company of Herbert Fierst, UNA; David Wainhouse, UNP; and Ray Thurston, EE. This meeting will be primarily devoted to firming up the list of topics for intelligence development and the establishment of relative priorities among these topics. The meeting is also likely to discuss the problem of an overall framework, problems of organizing the Government for this project, and various practical questions possibly including the shortage of key personnel for intelligence and other functions. In the course of these meetings I agreed on behalf of PSB staff to take (or recommend) the following actions:

- (1) To obtain, and transmit to Charles Allen, a brief memorandum outlining the intelligence manpower requirements of this project and the expected attrition of key OIR personnel. Allen raised this problem orally in the meeting. Ambassador Lodge expressed a desire to take whatever remedial action he can, including possibly a letter to Under Secretary Lourie.
- (2) To make arrangements for the prompt transmission of abstracts of intelligence material as it is developed, for the personal information of Ambassador Lodge as well as his staff. (I am going to discuss this point and point (1) with [redacted])

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- (3) To look into the possibility of asking our overseas posts for their views as to the psychological opportunities, problems, etc., in the countries to which they are accredited, which would bear on the shaping of this project. For security reasons, this would be done as a routine inquiry under the auspices of IIA. Charles Allen intends to suggest this to Joe Phillips and hopes that we can raise the same point with Phillips from this end. Allen will give us a memorandum proposing terms of reference for this inquiry.
- (4) To discuss with Joe Phillips the best way to obtain additional suggestions for exploitable topics from such entities as VOA, RFE, etc. Allen suggested a further meeting in Washington at which USUN would be represented following the May 26 meeting.
- (5) To explore on the staff level possible PSB assistance in developing the strategic and policy framework. (See Charlie Allen's memorandum, which he handed to me, "Psychological Program for the 7th GA, Second Part", dated February 16, 1953. This paper is helpful on the framework problem.)
- (6) To alert [] to the certainty that the current list of intelligence topics will be revised and probably expanded at next Tuesday's meeting, and will inevitably be subject to further revision thereafter.

As Item (4) above suggests, the selection of topics for intelligence development will unavoidably be a continuing process, although the basic list for action in CIR should emerge from the May 26 meeting.

Following are additional important points which emerged during the day:

- (1) The question of the submission of resolution or agenda items is still undecided. There is a general consensus that the submission of such items involves great difficulties in rounding up votes. Charlie Allen commented that in any case the psychological impact of a General Assembly vote is often greatly exaggerated, since world opinion pays little attention to this arithmetic except in the case of such key items as the Indian resolution on Korea. However, the submission of one or more resolutions or even agenda items as a part of this project is still a possibility.
- (2) The development of an over-all policy and strategic framework for this project, mentioned above, is necessarily complicated by our inability to predict the atmosphere that will prevail during the 8th GA. Any such paper, in its preliminary stages at least, would have to include a realistic set of assumptions. It might even be desirable to organize it in two or more parts

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representing different contingencies. However, John Ross emphasized the importance of developing some meaningful framework at an early date to furnish a basis for advance consultation with some of our allies.

- (3) The tentative check list for the 8th GA agenda should be closely examined in order to bring to light the psychological opportunities inherent in the various items. In this connection it was generally agreed that opportunities must be vigorously sought in the agenda of subsidiary UN bodies as well as the General Assembly itself. A "General Assembly Steering Committee" is now organizing itself in UNA under the chairmanship of Mr. Sandifer. Paul Taylor of UNP will play a key part in the work of this group. Jim Barco of USUN is in Washington today talking with this group and will explore with them the best way of integrating the "human rights" project with their work on the agenda.
- (4) There is no advance limitation on the audiences we will seek to affect by means of this project. Ambassador Lodge explicitly corrected any previous impression he may have given that his interest is primarily in the Arab-Asian "abstention" bloc. He is equally interested in exerting an impact in Europe and the USSR, the satellites, and Communist China. Jack Ross strongly emphasized the importance of the UK and Western European audiences, and called attention to the influence of the UK on the UN tactics of Commonwealth members, especially India.
- (5) The attrition of skilled personnel is not confined to intelligence. Charlie Allen is seriously worried about experienced speech writers and press relations men.
- (6) Ambassador Lodge reaffirmed his intention to get the greatest possible daily world press play out of this project. This would involve piece-meal releases of factual material day by day rather than the "omnibus" speech which gets only one headline.
- (7) Ambassador Lodge recognizes that the world psychological situation may develop adversely for a project such as this. However, he intends to plan for the possibility of a favorable atmosphere; to develop the necessary materials; and then to seek top-level acceptance of the project.
- (8) Various angles of the "orchestration" were discussed: the need for skilled men to handle the foreign press in New York; the problem of good liaison with the heads of the American wire services, which Ambassador Lodge intends to handle himself; the distribution of photographs to the working press covering the UN; and the preparation of kits for exploitation by USIS posts abroad.

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- (9) Although few specific topics for intelligence development were discussed, Ambassador Lodge did express interest in certain topics aimed at "intellectuals". Specifically mentioned were Soviet distortion and betrayal of classic Marxist theory, the non-fulfillment of Marxist economic prophecies, and Soviet duplicity as revealed in recent diplomatic history. In addition, I discussed with Allen the possibility of publicizing (in connection with the Korea POW issue) the brutal results of our repatriation of Soviet prisoners following World War II. He said this affair had been touched on lightly in some of our UN speeches, and expressed interest in the possibility of fuller treatment.

Wallace Irwin, Jr.
Office of Evaluation and Review

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Attachment 6.

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May 12, 1953

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
on May 11, 1953

Subject: Coordination of Ambassador Lodge's Requests

Participants: Mr. John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary of State
for United Nations Affairs

Dr. Horace S. Craig
Mr. Wallace Irwin, Jr.

Dr. Craig explained that his main purpose was to establish contact and to achieve an arrangement whereby UNA and PSB staff could cooperate in responding to the requests that PSB staff had received from Ambassador Lodge through C. D. Jackson. In this connection he called attention to the following matters:

1. The original letter from Ambassador Lodge to C. D. Jackson, asking for materials on Soviet human rights violations and outlining a UN exploitation campaign. Mr. Hickerson said he saw no difficulty in developing the material, although the manner of exploitation, as Ambassador Lodge himself was aware, would require further thought.
2. Dr. Craig also showed Mr. Hickerson the memo of the May 1 luncheon conversation with Ambassador Lodge and C. D. Jackson, which noted Ambassador Lodge's agreement that Mr. Hickerson should be informed of his desire to use PSB staff support for development of certain materials for his use as head of the UN delegation.
3. Dr. Craig further mentioned a list of 20 general topics we had submitted to Ambassador Lodge through Mr. Jackson at Ambassador Lodge's request -- potential topics having to do with exploitable Soviet actions or failures to act.
4. Dr. Craig also mentioned the request for a list of Soviet violations of UN agreements, which Mr. Hickerson felt should present no difficulty for the UNA staff.
5. Dr. Craig also noted that Mr. Irwin had been selected to work on Ambassador Lodge's staff in New York for about 6 weeks at the beginning of the UNQA session this fall.

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Dr. Craig asked whether Mr. Hickerson could designate a UNA staff member as a central point of contact to help PSB staff in developing the cooperation required, and also to help orient Mr. Irwin in preparation for his tour of duty in New York. Mr. Hickerson designated Herbert Pierst, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary.

Mr. Hickerson expressed his desire to be as helpful as possible in coordinating the activities of UNA and PSB staff in support of Ambassador Lodge.

PSB/R-Wirwin:gc

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